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I. Introduction
On July 26, 1990, in a joyous ceremony on the south lawn of the
White House, President George Bush signed the "Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990"lx into law. Before over 2000 invited guests, the
President declared:
The Americans with Disabilities- Act represents the full flowering
of our democratic principles, and it gives me great pleasure to sign
it into law today. . . .It promises to open up all aspects of Ameri-
can life to individuals with disabilities-employment opportunities,
government services, public accommodations, transportation and
telecommunications.2
In signing the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter
"ADA") into law, President Bush fulfilled a campaign pledge to pro-
vide people with disabilities with the same civil rights protections appli-
cable to women and minorities.3
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** Chairman, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington,
D.C. and former director of the Disability Rights Center, Washington, D.C.
*** Attorney-Advisor to the Chairman, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Washington, D.C. and author of numerous articles on the rights and obli-
gations of persons with disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
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1. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327-
378 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq.; 47 U.S.C. § 225, 611).
2. Statement on Signing the American With Disabilities Act of 1990, 26
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc 1165 (July 26, 1990).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 2 (1990) [hereinafter
HousE REPORT] (quoting Statement of Vice President George Bush on Disabled
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The Administration strongly supported enactment of the ADA be-
cause of the staggering social and economic cost of disability depen-
dency and discrimination. As Vice President, George Bush stated:
On the cost side, the National Council on the Handicapped states
that current [federal] spending on disability benefits and programs
exceeds $60 billion annually. Excluding the millions of disabled
who want to work from the employment ranks cost[s] society liter-
ally billions of dollars annually in support payments and lost in-
come tax revenues.'
A private economist recently estimated that in 1986 total federal,
state, and private expenditures on disability exceeded $169.4 billion an-
nually.5 Discrimination undermines the governmental efforts at rehabil-
itation and education of disabled children and adults. The federal and
state governments spend billions of dollars annually on such programs,
the beneficiaries of which then find their entry or re-entry into the
workforce barred by discrimination. The ADA, combined with simple
self-interest, should begin to break down the barriers to opportunity for
people with disabilities. A shrinking labor force caused by the aging
baby boom generation compels business to turn to segments of society
that have not participated fully in the labor force, including people
with disabilities.6
The need for the ADA is clear. In enacting the Americans with
Disabilities Act, Congress made the following findings:
o Historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individu-
als with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a
serious and pervasive social problem;
* Discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in
such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommoda-
tions, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institu-
tionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services;
e Individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms
Americans, March 31, 1988 at 2).
4. Id. at 43 (quoting Statement by Vice President George Bush on Disabled
Americans, March 31, 1988 at 2).
5. Berkowitz, Monroe, et al., Enhanced Understandings of the Economics of
Disability Final Report, Grant No: NIDRR G008300151 submitted to the State of
Virginia Department of Rehabilitative Services, August 31, 1988, p. II-1.
6. Id. at 44.
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of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the dis-
criminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communi-
cation barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make
modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary quali-
fication standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser
services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities;
- Census data, national polls, and other studies have documented
that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status
in our society, and are severally disadvantaged socially, vocation-
ally, economically, and educationally;
* The Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities
are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, indepen-
dent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; and
* The continued existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination
and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to
compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for
which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United
States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from de-
pendency and non-productivity.7
As President Bush stated, "the statistics consistently demonstrate
that disabled people are the poorest, least educated and largest minor-
ity in America."8 The Committee reports describe the appalling socio-
economic status of individuals with disabilities. The House Committee
on Education and Labor made the following comments in its report on
the ADA:
According to a recent Louis Harris poll, "not working" is perhaps
the truest definition of what it means to be disabled in America.
Two-thirds of all disabled Americans between the age of 16 and 64
are [not] working at all; yet, a large majority of those not working
say that they want to work. Sixty-six percent of working-age dis-
abled persons who are not working, say that they would like to
have a job.9
In 1988, men who reported a work disability earned 36 percent less
than men with no disability; in the same year women with a work disa-
7. Americans With Disabilities Act §§ 2(a), (3), (5), (6), (8), (9).
8. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 32-33 (quoting Statement of Vice President
George Bush on Disabled Americans, March 31, 1988 at 2).
9. Id. at 32 (citing Louis Harris and Associates, The ICD Survey of Disabled
Americans: Bringing Disabled Americans into the Mainstream (March 1986)).
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bility earned 38 % less than women without a work disability.10 Ameri-
cans with disabilities had a high school drop-out rate three times
greater than that of other Americans." Household income for persons
with disabilities is also significantly below that of non-disabled persons.
Fifty percent of all disabled adults had incomes of $15,000 or less in
1984 as compared with only 25 percent of non-disabled adults. 12 A ma-
jority of the people with disabilities who are not working and are out of
the labor force depend on insurance payments or government benefits
for support.' 3
The ADA was crafted to respond to the principal barriers to equal
opportunity facing people with disabilities. With respect to employ-
ment, the House Committee on Education and Labor identified the
following:
[T]he major categories of job discrimination faced by people with
disabilities include: use of standards and criteria that have the ef-
fect of denying such individuals equal job opportunities; failure to
provide or make available reasonable accommodations; refusal to
hire based on presumptions, stereotypes and myths about job per-
formance, safety, insurance costs, absenteeism, and acceptance by
others; placement into dead-end jobs; under-employment and lack
of promotion opportunities; and use of application forms and other
pre-employment inquiries that inquire about the existence of a dis-
ability rather than about the ability to perform the essential func-
tions of a job.14
This article provides an overview of the employment provisions of
the ADA, drawing on the statute, its legislative history, and pertinent
regulations and case law under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as
amended.
The employment provisions of the ADA become effective on July
10. Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, LABOR
FORCE STATUS AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: 1981-
1988, Current Population Reports, Special Studies Series P-23, No. 160, Table D, at
5).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 33.
14. Id. (citing to Hearings on H.R. 2273 Before the Subcommittee on Select
Education and the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of the House Com-
mittee on Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 53-73 (1989) (testimony of
Arlene Meyerson, Directing Attorney, Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund).
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26, 1992, two years after the date of enactment."' The substantive re-
quirements of Title I are drawn directly, and in many cases word-for-
word from regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973. These regulations, first promulgated by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, defined terms such as "handicapped
person,". "qualified handicapped person," "reasonable accommodation,"
the definition of discrimination, and the prohibition against certain pre-
employment inquiries.
The entities covered by the ADA and its enforcement scheme, on
the other hand, are drawn from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, sections of which are incorporated into the ADA by reference."l
II. Overview of the Act
A. Who Must Comply
Title I applies to an employer, employment agency, labor organi-
zation, or a joint labor-management committee, collectively referred to
as "covered entities. 17 The employment prohibitions are phased in
over a four year period to give smaller employers more time to learn of
their obligations.18 Beginning on July 26, 1992, the Act applies to em-
ployers with 25 or more employees; on July 26, 1994, this coverage is
extended to employers with 15 to 24 employees. 19
The term "employer" includes virtually every form of business or-
ganization, as well as state and local governments, that employs the
requisite number of individuals for each working day for 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.20 Certain entities are
exempted from coverage. The federal government, already covered by
similar requirements under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, is not cov-
ered. 21 Indian tribes and tax-exempt bona fide private membership
clubs are also exempt.22
15. Americans With Disabilities Act § 108.
16. Id. at §§ 101(7), 107.
17. Id. at § 101(2).
18. Id. at § 101(5)(A).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at § 101(5)(B)(i).
22. Id. at § 101(5)(B)(ii).
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B. What Employment Practices are Affected
The ADA prohibits discrimination in all stages of employment, in-
cluding "job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or dis-
charge of employees, employee'compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."2a This statutory list
of employment practices is not exclusive; Congress intended to regulate
all of the employment practices covered by the regulations implement-
ing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.24
C. Who is Protected from Discrimination by the ADA
Instead of providing a list of conditions constituting a covered dis-
ability, the ADA utilizes a functional definition that is almost identical
to the definition used in the Rehabilitation Act, as amended in 1974.25
The term "disability" is defined broadly to include not only persons
with actual handicaps but persons who have a history of or who are
perceived as disabled.28
1. Persons with actual disabilities
The first category of persons protected are those who have "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual. '27 Regulations implement-
ing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provide a definition of several
key terms used in the ADA's definition of disability and are cited with
approval in the Committee reports. As in the section 504 regulations,
the term "impairment" encompasses a wide range of diseases, condi-
tions, infections and disorders, 28 including: HIV disease; orthopedic im-
23. Id. at § 102(a).
24. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 25 (1989) [hereinafter SENATE RE-
PORT]; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 35 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.11 (b)
(1988)).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (B) (1988).
26. Id.
27. Section 3(2) of the Act defines "disability" as follows:
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual-
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
28. The House Committee on Education and Labor states:
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pairments; vision, speech, and hearing impairments; multiple sclerosis;
muscular dystrophy; cerebral palsy; mental retardation; cancer; heart
disease; diabetes; drug addiction and alcoholism; and many other con-
ditions.29 Certain personal characteristics, such as age or left-handed-
ness, and economic or social disadvantages, such as illiteracy or convic-
tion for a criminal offense, are not "impairments" and are therefore not
covered by the Act.30
The more difficult question is what it means for an impairment to
"substantially limit one or more [of an individual's] major life activi-
ties." Neither the term "substantially limits" nor the term "major life
activities" is defined in the statute. The Committee reports do, how-
ever, shed some light on the meaning of this phrase. The House Com-
mittee on Education and Labor noted in its report that not all impair-
ments are substantially limiting:
A person with a minor, trivial impairment, such as a simple
infected finger is not impaired in a major life activity. A person is
considered an individual with a disability for purposes of the first
prong of the definition when the individual's important life activi-
ties are restricted as to the conditions, manner, or duration under
which they can be performed in comparison to most people. A per-
son who can walk for ten miles continuously is not substantially
limited in walking merely because on the eleventh mile, he or she
begins to experience pain because most people would not be able to
walk eleven miles without experiencing some discomfort.3"
The Committee reports also sanction the list of major life activities
,provided in the section 504 regulations: "functions such as caring for
one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
The first prong of the definition includes any individual who has a
"physical or mental impairment." A physical or mental impairment means
(1) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or ana-
tomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurolog-
ical; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech
organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive; genitourinary; hemic and
lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (2) any mental or psychological disor-
der, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 51; SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 22.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 52; SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 23.
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breathing, learning, and working."' 2
In most cases, it will not be difficult to determine whether a person
is substantially limited in a major life activity. A paraplegic is substan-
tially limited in walking; a person with mental retardation is substan-
tially limited in learning; a person who is deaf is substantially limited
in hearing; and a person with serious lung disease is substantially lim-
ited in breathing. 3
The Committee reports also indicate that mitigating measures
such as reasonable accommodation, auxiliary aids or medication should
not be considered when determining whether an individual has a disa-
bility. Thus, a person who is hard of hearing is substantially limited in
hearing even if the hearing loss is corrected with hearing aids, and a
person with epilepsy may be substantially limited in one or more major
life activities even if the condition is controlled with medication.3 4
Two other categories of the definition protect individuals for whom
fears, myths and stereotypes rather than the impact of any impairment
have proven to be the basis for discrimination. This subgroup includes
persons who have a "record of" a substantially limiting impairment35
and those who are "regarded as" having such an impairment.36
2. Persons with a record of a disability
Persons who have a "record of" a disability include those who have
recovered in whole or in part from a disability, such as cancer or
mental illness, as well as persons who have been misclassified as having
a disability that the individual in fact does not have. 3
3. Persons regarded as being disabled
More controversial, and difficult to analyze, is the third prong of
the definition applying to persons being "regarded as" having a disabil-
ity. As with the other two categories of the definition, the third cate-
gory was adopted from the section 504 regulations:
32. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 22.
33. Id. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 52.
34. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 22; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3.
35. Americans With Disabilities Act § 3(2)(B).
36. Id. at § 3(2)(C).
37. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 52-53; SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at
[Vol. 15
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"Is regarded as having an impairment" means (A) has a physical
or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life
activities but that is treated by a recipient as constituting such a
limitation; (B) has a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of
others toward such impairment; or (C) has none of the impair-
ments defined in paragraph (j)(2)(i) of this section but is treated
by a recipient as having such an impairment.38
The "regarded as" part of the definition covers a person who does
not have an actual disability. This includes a person who has no impair-
ment. It also includes an individual with an impairment that does not
substantially limit a major life activity if an employer treats the im-
pairment as imposing greater limitations on an individual's activities
than it does in fact. Finally, where an employer treats an individual
adversely because of the possible negative reactions of third parties,
such as customers, co-workers or insurers, an individual with a non-
disabling impairment may also be protected. 9 Being regarded as dis-
abled focuses on the intent and state of mind of others rather than the
self-perception of the person with an impairment.40
Congress recognized that "disability" was not simply defined by
physiology but also by the reaction of others to a person's impairment.
Persons with stigmatizing impairments that do not limit a person's ac-
tivities may be victims of discrimination because of widespread fears or
stereotypes about the impairment or its effect on others. The Commit-
tee reports cite severe burn victims as one example of such discrimina-
tion. 1 As the Committee reports discuss, the need to define the defini-
tion of disability broadly to protect against societal discrimination also
was recognized by the Supreme Court in interpreting section 504.
The rationale for this third prong was clearly articulated by the
U.S. Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.42
The Court noted that Congress included this third prong because it was
as concerned about the effect of an impairment on others as it was
38. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, pt. 3, at 29 (quoting 45 C.F.R. §84.3
(j)(2)(iv)); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 53.
39. Burgdorf, Legal Analysis, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE TO IMPACT, ENFORCEMENT,
AND COMPLIANCE 93-96 (1990).
40. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 30.
41. Id.
42. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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about its effect on the individual. As the Court noted, the third prong
of the definition is designed to protect individuals who have impair-
ments that do not in fact substantially limit their functioning.43 The
Court explained: "Such an impairment might not diminish a person's
physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially
limit that person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions
of others to the impairment. 4 4
The Court went on to conclude:
By amending the definition of "handicapped individual" to include
not only those who are actually physically impaired but also those
who are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are substan-
tially limited in a major life activity, Congress acknowledged that
society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases
are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from
actual impairment.4 5
4. Denial of a single job for a single employer
Significant conceptual difficulties are raised when the definition of
disability is applied to an individual claiming to be disabled only in the
major life activity of working as a result of being denied an employ-
ment opportunity because of an actual or perceived impairment. It is
possible to argue that any adverse employment action taken on the ba-
sis of a person's impairment means that such person was substantially
limited in the major life activity of working or regarded as such by the
employer.46 Commentators have attacked this interpretation as ex-
panding the definition of disability to the point of being meaningless, 47
a conclusion reached by at least one court.48
The legislative history is unclear and inconsistent on this issue.
The House Judiciary Committee acknowledged that factors unique to a
particular job or job site that prevented a person from performing a
43. Id. at 283.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Jasany v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1248 n.2 (6th Cir.
1985).
47. Note, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Focusing the Definition of a Handi-
capped Individual, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 149, 170 (1988).
48. Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (C. D. Cal. 1984).
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particular job because of an impairment did not render the person sub-
stantially limited in working, but then noted:
However, if a person is employed as a painter and is assigned
to work with a unique paint which caused severe allergies, such as
skin rashes or seizures, the person would be substantially limited in
a major life activity, by virtue of the resulting skin disease or
seizure disorder.
49
It is not clear from the Committee's example whether the individual
with the skin rash is substantially limited in working or some other
unspecified major life activity. The Committee also noted: "A person
with an impairment who is discriminated against in employment is also
limited in the major life activity of working."50
Cases arising under section 504 have grappled with this question
as more and more persons with minor impairments have sought the
protection of the Rehabilitation Act after being denied employment or
discharged from a job. The weight of judicial authority under the Re-
habilitation Act indicates that denial of one job for one particular em-
ployer does not establish that a person is substantially limited in work-
ing.51 While a clearly defined legal standard has not yet emerged under
the Rehabilitation Act, several courts have looked to the number and
49. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 29. It is worth noting that the original
version of the bill, the "Americans With Disabilities Act of 1988," S. 2345, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), prohibited discrimination because of a physical or mental im-
pairment, perceived impairment or record of impairment, regardless of whether an im-
pairment substantially limited a major life activity.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986); Jasany v. U.S.
Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir. 1985); Miller v. AT&T Network Sys-
tems, 722 F. Supp. 633, 639 (D. Or. 1989), Trembczsynski v. Calumet City, LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist. file, 8117 (N.D. I11. 1987); Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
659 F. Supp. 1328, 1343 (S.D. Tex. 1987), affd without opinion, 863 F.2d 881 (5th
Cir. 1988); Wright v. Tisch, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 151, 153 (E.D. Va.
1987); McCleod v. City of Detroit, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 225, 228 (E.D.
Mich. 1985); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1984);
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099-1100 (D. Haw. 1980), vacated,
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Donovan, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 1183 (D Haw. 1981).
However, one commentator directly involved in the drafting of the legislation pointed
to certain parts of the legislative history and the minority judicial view under the Reha-
bilitation Act, and interpreted the definition broadly to cover any individual who is
denied a job because of any impairment, no matter how minor the disability. See
Burgdorf, supra note 39.
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types of jobs from which the individual is excluded, the geographical
area to which the individual has reasonable access, and the individual's
job expectations and education in order to establish whether a person's
employment opportunities are seriously affected by an impairment.5 2
The legislative history is only slightly more helpful in determining
whether a person is always "regarded as" disabled when denied an em-
ployment opportunity by an employer because of an impairment. One
committee stated broadly:
A person who is excluded from any basic life activity, or is other-
wise discriminated against, because of a covered entity's negative
attitudes toward that person's impairment is treated as having a
disability. Thus, for example, if an employer refuses to hire some-
one because of a fear of the "negative reactions" of others to the
individual, or because of the employer's perception that the appli-
cant has an impairment which prevents that person from working,
that person is covered under the third prong of the definition of
disability.53
Another Committee noted:
Thus, a person who is rejected from a job because of the
myths, fears and stereotypes associated with disabilities would be
covered under this third test, whether or not the employer's percep-
tion was shared by others in the field and whether or riot the per-
son's physical or mental condition would be considered a disability
under the first or second part of the definition.
Sociologists have identified common barriers that frequently
result in employers excluding disabled persons. These include con-
cerns regarding productivity, safety, insurance, liability, attend-
ance, cost of accommodation and accessibility, and acceptance by
workers and customers.
This list of frequent workplace concerns is not exhaustive. It
illustrates, however, the attitudinal barriers that Congress clearly
intended to include within the meaning of "regarded as" having a
52. See Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986); Jasany v. U.S.
Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir. 1985) (following the analysis set forth in
E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099-1100 (D. Haw. 1980), vacated,
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Donovan, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 1183 (D. Haw. 1981)).
53. House REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 53 (citing School Bd. of Nassau
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987)); Thornhill v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 1182 (9th
Cir. 1989); Doe v. Centenela Hosp. LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file, 8401 (C.D. Cal.
1988).
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disability under the Rehabilitation Act and now under the ADA.
It is not necessary for the covered entity to articulate one of
these concerns. In the employment context, if a person is disquali-
fied on the basis of an actual or perceived physical or mental condi-
tion, and the employer can articulate no legitimate job-related rea-
son for the rejection, a perceived concern about employing persons
with disabilities could be inferred and the plaintiff would qualify
for coverage under the "regarded as" test. A person who is covered
because of being regarded as having an impairment is not required
to show that the employer's perception is inaccurate, e.g., that he
will be accepted by others, or that insurance rates will not increase,
in order to be qualified for the job.
For example, many people are rejected from jobs because a
back x-ray reveals some anomaly, even though the person has no
symptoms of a back impairment. The reasons for the rejection are
often the fear of injury, as well as increased insurance or worker's
compensation costs. These reasons for rejection rely on common
barriers to employment for persons with disabilities and therefore,
the person is perceived to be disabled under the third test."
Case law arising under the Rehabilitation Act has not always in-
terpreted this aspect of the definition as broadly. For example, in For-
risi v. Bowen,5 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
jected the claim of a utility systems engineer who asserted that he was
regarded as handicapped when he was denied a job because his acro-
phobia prevented him from climbing a ladder. The court, however, con-
cluded that "[flar from being regarded as having a substantial limita-
tion in employability, Forrisi was seen as unsuited for one position in
one plant-and nothing more." 56 Said the court, "[t]he Rehabilitation
Act seeks to remedy perceived handicaps that, like actual disabilities,
extend beyond this isolated mismatch of employer and employee. '57
Most other courts have reached similar conclusions.58
54. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 30-31.
55. 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
56. Id. at 935
57. Id.
58. Lekelt v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. La. 1989), aff'd, 909
F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990); Mahoney v. Ortiz, 645 F. Supp. 22, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); De
La Torres v. Bolger, 610 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Tex. 1985), affid, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th.
Cir. 1986); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984); E.E.
Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp 1088 (D. Haw. 1980), vacated, E.E. Black, Ltd.
v. Donovan, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 1183 (D.Haw. 1981); Wright v. Tisch, 45
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 151 (E.D. Va 1987). But see Thornhill v. Marsh, 866
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5. Persons with a known association with a disabled person
In addition to protecting persons with disabilities, the ADA also
prohibits discrimination against a person who is known to associate
with a disabled person.59 The provision is limited to persons who are
qualified and who suffer discrimination because of their known associa-
tion with a person whose disability is also known to the employer.6 0
Efforts to limit the scope of the provision to relationship by blood, mar-
riage, guardianship or adoption were twice rejected. 61 The provision is
intended to prohibit employers from denying employment to a qualified
applicant with a disabled spouse because the employer is under the
mistaken assumption that the applicant will miss too much work caring
for the spouse with a disability. Of course, if the applicant is hired and
misses work in violation of the employer's policy on attendance or tar-
diness for this reason, the employer is free to discharge the employee
for poor attendance and need make no allowance even if the cause of
the poor attendance or tardiness is because the employee is caring for
the disabled spouse.62
6. Exclusions from the definition of disability
Excluded from the definition is any person who currently engages
in the illegal use of drugs if the employer acts on the basis of such
illegal use.63 Also excluded as not constituting impairments are homo-
sexuality and bisexuality. Additionally, transvestitism, transsexualism,
voyeurism, pedophilia and certain other gender identity disorders are
not covered. Persons who are compulsive gamblers, have kleptomania
or pyromania, and persons with psychoactive substance use disorders
resulting from current illegal use of drugs are also not protected from
discrimination by the Act.6 4
D. Who is a "'Qualified Individual with a Disability?"
The ADA protects only those persons with a disability who are
F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
59. Americans With Disabilities Act § 102(b)(4).
60. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 38.
61. Id., pt. 2, at 60-61.
62. Id. at 61-62.
63. Americans With Disabilities Act §§ 104(a),(b), & 510.
64. Id. at §§ 508, 511.
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qualified to perform a particular job in spite of their disability.6" The
statute defines the term to mean "an individual with a disability who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires."68 The individual with a disability must possess the necessary
knowledge, skills and physical and mental ability to perform the essen-
tial job functions, with or without reasonable accommodation.6
Congress provided little guidance on the distinction between essen-
tial and non-essential job functions except to indicate:
As the 1977 regulations issued by the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare pointed out "inclusion of this phrase is useful
in emphasizing that handicapped persons should not be disqualified
simply because they may have difficulty in performing tasks that
bear only a marginal relationship to a particular job." 42 Fed. Reg.
22686 (1977). For example, many employers have a policy that, in
order to qualify for a job, an employee must have a driver's license
even though the job does not involve driving. The employer may
believe that someone who drives will be on time for work or may be
able to do an occasional errand. This requirement, however, would
be marginal and should not be used to exclude persons with disabil-
ities who can do the essential functions of the job that do not in-
clude driving.68
In determining what functions of a job are essential rather than
marginal, Congress directed that a job description, prepared in advance
of advertising or interviewing for a job, be considered as evidence of
what the employer considers to be essential, and that the employer's
judgment must be considered. However, both the legislative history of
the ADA69 and case law under the Rehabilitation Act indicate that an
employer's judgment is subject to challenge and rebuttal by a
65. Id. at §§ 101(8), 102(a). "[T]his legislation does not undermine an employ-
ers ability to choose and maintain qualified workers. This legislation simply provides
that employment decisions must not have the purpose or effect of subjecting a qualified
individual with a disability to discrimination on the basis of his or her disability."
66. Id. at § 101(8).
67. HOusE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 64-65; SENATE REPORT, supra note
24, at 33-34.
68. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 55.
69. 136 CONG. REC. H2469-70 (daily ed. May 17, 1990); HousE REPORT, supra
note 3, pt. 2, at 55; pt. 3, at 33.
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plaintiff.1 0
The definition of "qualified individual with a disability" also indi-
cates that if an individual is not qualified because a disability prevents
performance of essential job functions, the individual may become
qualified with a reasonable accommodation. That an unqualified person
may become qualified through an employer provided reasonable accom-
modation is a central requirement of disability nondiscrimination law.71
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted a similar two step analysis in School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline.7 2 First, an employer must deter-
mine whether an applicant with a disability can perform the essential
functions of the position in spite of the disability and, if not, whether
the employer can provide a reasonable accommodation that would per-
mit the individual to perform those functions.7 3 In order to avoid "dep-
rivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear," courts
and administrative agencies "will need to conduct an individualized in-
quiry and make appropriate findings of fact. 74
E. Qualification Standards and Selection Criteria
The ADA provides that it is discriminatory to:
us[e] qualification standards, employment tests or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a
disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the stan-
dard, test or other selection criteria as used by the covered entity is
shown to be job-related for the position in question and consistent
70. See, e.g., Hall v. United States Postal Service, 857 F.2d 1073, 1079-80 (6th
Cir. 1988); Davis v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 447, 454 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
71. Burgdorf, supra note 39, at 109.
72. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
73. Id. at 287 n.17.
74. Id. at 287. Although recognizing that blanket criteria that exclude an entire
class of disabled persons are disfavored because they preclude an individualized assess-
ment of ability, some courts have approved blanket exclusions in particular circum-
stances: Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 592 (3rd
Cir. 1989) (insulin-dependent diabetics excluded from being FBI special agents); Local
1812, American Fed. of Gov't. Employees v. Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C.
1987) (persons with HIV disease excluded from State Department Foreign Service po-
sitions); Sharon v. Larson, 650 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (visually-impaired per-
sons with bioptic lenses excluded from obtaining drivers license); Anderson v. USAir,
619 F. Supp. 1191 (D.D.C. 1985), aft'd, 818 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (prohibiting
blind persons next to emergency plane exits).
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with business necessity .... 75
Drawn from section 504 regulations, this standard is intended to ensure
that persons with disabilities are not excluded from jobs by selection
criteria that are not in fact necessary for effective job performance.
While this limitation on selection criteria bears a distant relationship to
the disparate impact theory of discrimination developed by the courts
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,76 it is quite different in
several important details. First, unlike Title VII, a statistical showing
that a class of individuals has been disparately affected by a neutral
standard is not required. The neutral selection criteria need only screen
out "an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disa-
bilities . ,. ." As the analysis to the original section 504 regulations
indicated, "the small number of handicapped persons taking tests
would make statistical showings of 'disproportionate, adverse effect'
difficult and burdensome. '77
Second, the ADA appears to place the burden of proving that a
selection criteria is job related and consistent with business necessity on
the employer rather than the claimant, as is currently the case under
Title VII. The Committee reports indicate that the burden of proof
should be assigned as it is under section 504 implementing regulations
which explicitly required employers to justify challenged selection crite-
ria.78 Section 504 case law similarly required employers to show that
qualifications and selection criteria were reasonable, necessary and le-
gitimate.79 The Committee reports make clear that employers may still
establish physical ability criteria so long as they are job-related:
Under this standard, employers may continue to establish le-
gitimate, job-related physical requirements for a particular posi-
tion. Thus, for example, an employer may adopt a physical crite-
rion that an applicant be able to lift fifty pounds, if that ability is
75. Americans With Disabilities Act § 102(b)(6).
76. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989); Watson v. Ft.
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1987); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
77. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 352 (1988).
78. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 72; pt. 3, at 42.
79. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 409 (1979);
Strathie v. Dep't of Transportation, 716 F.2d 227 (3rd Cir. 1983) Simon v. St. Louis
County, 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982); Bentivegna v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982); Prewitt v. United States
Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 306, 321 (5th Cir. 1981).
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necessary to an individual's ability to perform the essential func-
tions of the job in question. Or, for example, security concerns may
constitute valid job criteria. For example, jewelry stores often em-
ploy security officers because of the frequency of "snatch and run"
thefts. Mobility and dexterity may be essential job criteria in such
jobs.80
Formal job validation studies were not required under the Rehabilita-
tion Act to demonstrate job-relatedness. 81
The Committee reports also instruct how the legitimacy of selec-
tion criteria and qualification standards relate to an employer's deter-
mination whether an applicant with a disability is qualified with or
without a reasonable accommodation:
The three pivotal provisions to assure a fit between job criteria and
an applicant's actual ability to do the job are:
(1) the requirement that individuals with disabilities not be
disqualified because of their inability to perform non-essential or
marginal functions of the job;
(2) the requirement that any selection criteria that screen out
or tend to screen out individuals with disabilities be job-related and
consistent with business necessity; and
(3) the requirement to provide a reasonable accommodation to
assist individuals with disabilities to meet legitimate criteria.
These three legal requirements. . . work together to provide a
high degree of protection to eliminate the current pervasive bias
against employing persons with disabilities in the selection process.
The interrelationship of these requirements of the selection
process procedure is as follows: If a person with a disability applies
for a job and meets all selection criteria except one that he or she
cannot meet because of a disability, the criterion must concern an
essential, non-marginal aspect of the job, and be carefully tailored
to measure the person's actual ability to do this essential function
of the job. If the criterion meets this test, it is nondiscriminatory on
its face and it is otherwise lawful under the legislation. However,
80. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 56; see also SENATE REPORT, supra
note 24, at 27.
81. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 352 states: "A recipient is no longer limited to
using predictive validity studies as a method for demonstrating that a test or other
selection criterion is in fact job-related. Nor, in all cases, are predictive validity studies
sufficient to demonstrate that a test or criterion is job-related." Ths Uniform Guide-
lines on Employee Selection Procedures (UGESP) do not apply to cases arising under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2(d) (1990).
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the criterion may not be used to exclude an applicant with a disa-
bility if the criterion can be satisfied by the applicant with a rea-
sonable accommodation. A reasonable accommodation may entail
adopting an alternative, less discriminatory criterion.82
The Committees' explanation of the interplay was embodied in the
statute, which provides that an employer is not liable if a person with a
disability is adversely affected in employment because of the applica-
tion of a qualification standard that is job-related and consistent with
business necessity and the person with a disability cannot satisfy the
standard with a reasonable accommodation. 83
F. Qualifications Relating to the Safety of Others
The ADA also provides that employers may require, as a qualifica-
tion standard, that an individual not "pose a direct threat to the health
or safety of other individuals in the workplace."84 The term "direct
threat" means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that
cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. '8 5 The ADA's leg-
islative history indicates that this provision codifies the Supreme
Court's decision in Arline.86 In remanding the case back to the district
court to determine whether a school teacher who had tuberculosis
would pose a risk of harm to her school children, the district court was
instructed to make:
[findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given
the state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk
(b) the duration of the risk . . .(c) the severity of the risk
and (d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will
cause varying degrees of harm.8 7
82. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 71; SENATE REPORT, supra note 24,
at 62.
83. Americans With Disabilities Act § 103(a).
84. Id. at § 103(b).
85. Id. at § 101(3).
86. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
87. Id. at 288. On remand, the district court concluded that 1laintiff Arline was
discharged illegally from her employment in violation of section 504 and the school
board was ordered to reinstate her or offer her front pay. Arline v. School Bd. of Nas-
sau County, 692 F. Supp. 1286 (M.D. Fla. 1988). The Conference Report also provides
that an employer may:
take action to protect the rights of its employees and other individuals in
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As in the ADA, the court concluded that if a significant risk of
harm was found to exist as a result of the individualized inquiry, the
district court must then inquire as to the availability of a reasonable
accommodation."8 The court indicated that "[a] person who poses a
significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in the
workplace will not be .. .qualified for his or her job if reasonable
accommodation will not eliminate that risk."' 9
The ADA also provides that the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) shall publish and update annually
a list of communicable and infectious diseases which are transmitted by
handling food. Any individual having a communicable disease con-
tained on the HHS list may be denied a job involving food handling
unless the risk can be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.9"
G. Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship
The reasonable accommodation requirement is a key element in
disability nondiscrimination law. First mandated by Department of La-
bor regulations issued in 1976 to implement section 503 of the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973, the requirement has been a controversial one since
its inception. The rationale for such a requirement was clearly articu-
lated by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in its 1983 report, Ac-
commodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities:
Discrimination against handicapped people cannot be eliminated if
programs, activities and tasks are always structured in the ways
people with "normal" physical and mental abilities customarily un-
dertake them. Adjustments or modifications of opportunities to per-
the workplace. Such employer action would include not assigning an indi-
vidual to a job if such an assignment would pose a direct threat to individ-
uals in the workplace and such a threat could not be eliminated by reason-
able accommodation .... In determining what constitutes a significant
risk, the Conferees intend that the employer may take into consideration
such factors as the magnitude, severity or likelihood of risk to other indi-
viduals in the workplace and that the burden would be on the employer to
show the relevance of such factors in relying on the qualification standard.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1990) [hereinafter HOUSE CON-
FERENCE REPORT].
88. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
89. Id. at 287 n.16.
90. Americans With Disabilities Act § 103(d); see also HousE CONFERENCE RE-
PORT, supra note 87.
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mit handicapped people to participate fully have been broadly
termed reasonable accommodation."'
The concept of reasonable accommodation as individualizing employ-
ment opportunities is applied in the ADA. The ADA defines as prohib-
ited discrimination:
(A) not making reasonable accommodation to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless the cov-
ered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or
employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability,
if such denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make
reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments
of the employee or applicant.92
The Committee reports make clear that determining what accom-
modation is required necessitates a highly fact specific inquiry.93 As the
House Judiciary Committee stated: "A reasonable accommodation
should be tailored to the needs of the individual and the requirements
of the job."" Reasonable accommodation, however, is defined in the
statute only by a list of examples:
The term "reasonable accommodation" may include-
(A) making existing facilities used by employers readily acces-
sible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of quali-
fied readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities. 95
91. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individ-
ual Abilities, 102 [hereinafter Civil Rights].
92. Americans With Disabilities Act § 102(b)(5).
93. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 31; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2,
at 62; pt. 3 at 39.
94. House REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 39.
95. Americans With Disabilities Act § 101(9).
1991]
21
Kemp and Bell: A Labor Lawyer's Guide to the Americans with Disabilities Act of
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
The statutory list of examples is taken from regulations imple-
menting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,96 and is not
intended to be exhaustive. 97
The addition of "reassignment to a vacant position" settles a dis-
pute that arose in the courts under section 501 of the Rehabilitation
Act where a majority of courts had held that reassignment was not a
form of reasonable accommodation. 98 The Committee reports indicate,
however, that efforts should be made to accommodate the employee in
his or her current position before reassignment to a vacant position is
considered and that bumping another employee to create a vacant posi-
tion is not required.99
96. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b)(regulation implementing § 504).
97. See Civil Rights, supra note 91.
98. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1987)
("Employers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable accommodation for a
handicapped employee. Although they are not required to find another job for an em-
ployee who is not qualified for the job he or she was doing, they cannot deny an em-
ployee alternative employment opportunities reasonably available under the employers
existing policies."); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987); Davis v. United
States Postal Service, 675 F. Supp. 225 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Dancy v. Kline, 639 F. Supp.
1076 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985); Alderson v.
Postmaster General of the United States, 598 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Okla. 1984); Jasany
v. United States Postal Service, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1115 (N.D. Ohio
1983), aff'd on other grounds, 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985); Wright v. Tisch, 45 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 151 (E.D. Va. 1987). But see Coley v. Secretary of the
Army, 689 F. Supp. 519 (D.Md. 1987); Rhone v. United States Dep't of the Army,
665 F.,Supp. 734 (E.D. Mo. 1987). Accord American Federation of Government Em-
ployees Local 51 v. Baker, 677 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
99. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 32; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2,
at 63. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is proposing to address the
issue of reassignment as part of its restructuring of the federal government's equal
employment opportunity complaint process. Under proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(g)
(1990), reassignment is considered an affirmative action obligation of federal agencies
pursuant to section 501(b) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §
791(b) (1988), rather than a part of an agency's reasonable accommodation obligation.
The proposal limits the affirmative duty to reassign to non-probationary employees who
are unable to perform satisfactorily in their current positions even with reasonable ac-
commodation. When a non-probationary employee becomes unable, because of a disa-
bility, to perform his or her current position, an agency is obligated to reassign the
employee to a funded vacant position within the same appointing authority for which
the person is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation. The vacant position
should be within the same commuting area and at the same pay level or at the next
highest pay level available below the employee's current pay level. If the vacant posi-
tion has already been announced at the time the agency determined the individual to
be incapable of performing in his or her current position, however, the individual need
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With respect to alterations to existing facilities, the employment
title does not appear to require employers to undertake the wholesale
retrofitting of existing buildings in order to provide full accessibility for
people with disabilities generally, in advance of an individual's request
and without regard to a particular person's needs. Accessibility require-
ments applicable to public accommodations, on the other hand, focus
on barrier removal for mobility-impaired and sensory- impaired persons
as a class. The public accommodation title requires differing degrees of
accessibility for new construction major renovations, and readily
achievable modifications to existing facilities. The focus of barrier re-
moval as a reasonable accommodation under Title I is on the needs of a
specific applicant or employee with a disability and is subject to the
undue hardship limitation, not the much lower "readily achievable"
standard applicable to modifications made to an existing facility of a
public accommodation to provide access for customers.100
With respect to job-restructuring, the Committee reports indicate
that "[j]ob restructuring means modifying a job so that a person with a
disability can perform the essential functions of the position," and that
this legislation does not require an employer to make any adjustment,
modification or change in the job description or policy that an employer
can demonstrate would fundamentally alter the essential functions of
the job in question.' 0' Case law under the Rehabilitation Act is clear
that job restructuring does not require the elimination of essential job
functions nor the creation of a new job by combining essential job tasks
from other jobs. 10 2 Similarly, an employer is not required to lower per-
formance standards relating to the quantity or quality of an employee's
work.103 Technological advances have produced a wide array of prod-
not be reassigned but must be allowed to compete on an equal basis for the position.
Reassignment is not applicable to employees of the U.S. Postal Service if such reas-
signment would conffict with the terms of an applicable collective bargaining
agreement.
100. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 109; pt. 3, at 59-62. Of course, an
employer in a large metropolitan area where there is likely to be a large number of
mobility-impaired persons may well wish to make its existing facilities accessible based
on the likelihood that it will receive such a request.
101. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 109; pt. 3, at 59-62.
102. Hall v. United States Postal Service, 857 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1988); Wal-
lace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758 (D. Kan. 1988); Dancy v. Kline, 44 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 380 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
103. Jasany v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1250-51 (6th Cir.
1985)(section 504 did not require recipients to lower or substantially modify their stan-
dards) (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979));
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ucts that enable individuals with disabilities to compete successfully in
the workplace. The provisions of such assistive devices are a common
form of reasonable accommodation. Committee reports refer to adap-
tive computer hardware and software, electronic visual aids, talking
calculators, magnifiers, audio or braille material for blind and visually
impaired persons. Deaf persons can also benefit from the use of techno-
logical devices including Telecommunication Devices for the Deaf
(TDDs), telephone headset amplifiers, and telephones compatible with
hearing aids. However, hearing aids, eyeglasses or other personal use
items are not considered reasonable accommodations.0
Appropriate adjustment of examinations and training materials
may be required; training should be offered in accessible locations and
material should be offered in an accessible format.0 5 In addition, the
see also Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418 (D. Conn. 1987) (agency not required to
provide stool or platform to person with dwarfism as that would reduce efficiency below
a tolerable level). But see Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (assuming
that lowering an employee's quantity of work standard was an accommodation); Brueg-
ging v. Burke, 696 F. Supp. 674 (D.D.C. 1988) (reduction in volume of work is a
reasonable accommodation but lowering the high degree of accuracy required as a crit-
ical element of position is not an accommodation), cert. denied, Bruegging v. Wilson,
488 U.S. 1009 (1989).
104. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 32-33; HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt.
2, at 64.
105. Id. The obligation to make training accessible to all employees without re-
gard to disability, like other ADA obligations, applies whether the training is provided
by the employer directly or by contract with third parties. See Americans With Disa-
bilities Act § 102(b)(2). The report of the House Committee on Education and Labor
explains:
For example, assume that an employer is seeking to contract with a
company to provide training for the first entity's employees. Whatever re-
sponsibilities and limitations of reasonable accommodation that would ap-
ply to the employer if it provided the training itself would apply as well in
the contractual situation. Thus, if the training company were planning to
hold its program in a physically inaccessible location, thus making it im-
possible for an employee who used a wheelchair to attend the program, the
employer would have a duty to consider various reasonable accommoda-
tions. These could include, for example, (1) asking the training company
to identify other sites for the training that are accessible; (2) identifying
other training companies that use accessible sites; (3) paying to have the
training company train the disabled employee (either one on one or with
other employees who may have missed the training for other reasons), or
any other accommodation that might result in making the training availa-
ble to the employee.
If no accommodations were available that would make the training
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ADA explicitly requires that employers select and administer examina-
tions in a manner calculated to measure the knowledge, skills, and abil-
ities of the applicant or employee, rather than his or her impaired man-
ual, sensory or speaking skills.106
The provision of qualified readers and interpreters has been in-
cluded as a form of reasonable accommodation since the section 504
regulations were first issued in 1977.07 The committee reports also in-
dicate that provision of an attendant may also be an appropriate
program accessible, or if the only options that were available would impose
an undue hardship on the employer, the employer would then have met its
requirements under the Act. The Committee anticipates, however, that
certainly some form of accommodation could be made such that the dis-
abled employee would not be completely precluded from receiving training
that the employer may consider necessary.
As a further example, assume that an employer contracts with a hotel
for a conference held for the employer's employees. Under the Act, the
employer has an affirmative duty to investigate the accessibility of a loca-
tion that it plans to use for its own employees. Suggested approaches for
determining accessibility would be for the employer to check out the hotel
first-hand, if possible, or to ask a local disability group to check out the
hotel. In any event, the employer can always protect itself in such situa-
tions by simply ensuring that the contract with the hotel specifies that all
rooms to be used for the conference, including the exhibit and meeting
rooms, be accessible in accordance with applicable standards. If the hotel
breaches this accessibility provision, the hotel will be liable to the employer
for the cost of any accommodation needed to provide access to the disabled
individual during the conference, as well as for any other costs accrued by
the employer. Placing.a duty on the employer to investigate accessibility of
places that it contracts for will, in all likelihood, be the impetus for ensur-
ing that these types of contractual provisions become commonplace in our
society.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 60.
106. Americans With Disabilities Act § 102(b)(7); see, e.g., HousE REPORT,
supra note 3, pt. 2, at 71-72 (discussing Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666 (11th Cir.
1983)).
107. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b)(1989). See, e.g., Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp.
369 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (readers), aff'd mem., 732 F.2d 146 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1188 (1985); Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (readers);
United States v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama, 908 F.2d 740 (1lth Cir. 1990)
(University obligated by section 504 to provide interpreters for deaf students); Roths-
child v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1990) (school district obligated by section
504 to provide interpreter for deaf parents of pupil); Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559
(9th Cir. 1989) (state corrections agency obligated to provide an interpreter for deaf
blind prisoner).
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accommodation.Y8
1. Who is eligible for reasonable accommodation
An employer's obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation
may arise at any stage in the employment process, including applicant
testing and interviewing, hiring and placement, training, promotion,
transfer, and discharge or retirement. Any time a person's job or disa-
bility changes, a new accommodation may be required or an existing
accommodation may have to be adjusted. The statute is clear that an
applicant or employee must be an individual with a disability in order
to qualify for an accommodation.
Second, as the statutory language indicates, the duty to accommo-
date is to the "known" physical or mental limitations of a person with a
disability.10 9 This provision codifies section 504 case law which indi-
cated that an employer is not obligated to accommodate a person's
physical or mental limitations of which it had no knowledge. 110 This
usually means that an employee must make his or her disability known
and request an accommodation before an employer has a duty to pro-
vide one."" Since it is a stereotype that all people with disabilities will
need accommodation, an employer should not assume, in the absence of
a request, that a particular individual will require an accommoda-
tion,"' and it is discriminatory to force an accommodation on a dis-
abled person who does not need one."13 Indeed, the ADA specifically
provides that "[n]othing in this Act ...require[s] an individual to
accept an accommodation, aid, service, opportunity or benefit which
such individual chooses not to accept."" 4
108. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 33; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2,
at 64; pt. 3, at 39.
109. Americans With Disabilities Act § 102(b)(5)(A).
110. The employer's obligation to accommodate is triggered only when the em-
ployer has actual knowledge of the impairment and the need for accommodation. Lut-
ter v. Fowler, 41 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1227 (D.D.C. 1986), affid, 808 F.2d
137 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Walker v. Atty. Gen. of the United States, 572 F. Supp. 100 (D.
D.C. 1983).
111. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 34; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2,
at 65; pt. 3, at 39. Of course, if an individual with a known disability is having diffi-
culty performing on the job, an employer may wish to inquire whether an accommoda-
tion would be of assistance. Id.
112. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 39.
113. See, e.g., Chalk v. Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
114. Americans With Disabilities Act § 501(d).
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Third, only an "otherwise qualified" individual with a disability is
entitled to accommodation. The term "otherwise qualified" should not
be confused with that term as used in section 504, where it meant
"qualified in spite of a handicap." Rather, the legislative history indi-
cates that "otherwise qualified" refers to an applicant or employee who
is able to meet all of an employer's job-related selection criteria except
the criterion the individual cannot meet because of a disability. Thus,
the individual must be able to satisfy all legitimate knowledge, educa-
tion, and experience requirements in order to be considered for an ac-
commodation.' 1 5 Providing a reasonable accommodation then permits
the individual to satisfy the remaining criterion by enabling the individ-
ual to perform the essential functions of the job.11 6
2. The reasonable accommodation process
Because the reasonable accommodation requirement responds to
the unique abilities and limitations of an applicant or employee in rela-
tion to specific job duties, it is not possible to set out specific rules dic-
tating what accommodations are required for specific disabilities and
specific jobs. Employers must have the flexibility to make accommoda-
tion decisions that reflect both the employee's needs and the particulars
of the job to be performed. The House Committee on Education and
Labor and the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources an-
alyze reasonable accommodation as a process:
The Committee believes that the reasonable accommodation
requirement is best understood as a process in which barriers to a
particular individual's equal employment opportunity are removed.
The accommodation process focuses on the needs of a particular
individual in relation to problems in performance of a particular
job because of a physical or mental impairment. A problem-solving
approach should be used to identify the particular tasks or aspects
of the work environment that limit performance and to identify
possible accommodations that will result in a meaningful equal op-
portunity for the individual with a disability.' 17
Frequently, the applicant or employee will know exactly what ac-
115. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 33-34; HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt.
2, at 64-65; see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1990).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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27
Kemp and Bell: A Labor Lawyer's Guide to the Americans with Disabilities Act of
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
commodation is needed from prior experience in similar employment or
in coping with the disability on a daily basis. The Committee reports
recognize, however, that this will not always be the case. Where an
individual with a disability is unable to identify an accommodation that
will enable successful job performance without imposing undue hard-
ship on the employer, the Committees suggest that the employer under-
take "four informal steps" to identify and provide an appropriate
accommodation.
The first step is to identify the barriers to the employment oppor-
tunity. An employer must distinguish between essential and marginal
functions of the job. Next, with the cooperation of the disabled person,
the employer must identify the abilities and limitations of the applicant
or employee. The employer is then in a position to identify the essential
functions of the job or aspects of the work environment that the dis-
abled person cannot satisfy because of his or her disability.
The second informal step is to identify possible accommodations.
The disabled person should be consulted first and throughout the ac-
commodation process. The Committee reports indicate that, where nec-
essary, an employer may need to consult the state vocational rehabilita-
tion services agency, the Job Accommodation Network of the
President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, or
other employers.
The degree of an employer's affirmative duty to find possible ac-
commodations is not clear. A majority of the case law under section
504 has held that once a plaintiff makes a facial showing that reasona-
ble accommodation is possible, the burden shifts to the defendant to
demonstrate that no accommodation was available that would enable
the plaintiff to perform the essential functions of the job or that the
only accommodations would impose an undue hardship. Then the bur-
den shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut the employer's evidence. 18 A
number of courts interpreting the Rehabilitation Act have indicated
that employers have a duty to use experts to identify possible accom-
modations. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
118. Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1989); Gardner v. Morris, 752
F.2d 1271, 1280 (8th Cir. 1985); Jasany v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d
1244, 49-50 (6th Cir. 1985); Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292,
307 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985); Simon v. St. Louis County, 735
F.2d 1082, 84 (8th Cir. 1984); Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 475 (1lth Cir.
1983).
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cuit stated that, "an employer has a duty under the [Rehabilitation]
Act to gather sufficient information from the applicant and from quali-
fied experts as needed to determine what accommodations are neces-
sary to enable the applicant to perform the job safely."11" 9
On the other hand, it is clear that an employer's duty to investi-
gate possible accommodations is not limitless. A court recently ruled
that an employer had made sufficient efforts to accommodate an em-
ployee allergic to dust and chemical fumes when it transferred him five
times and gave him a respirator which he refused to wear. 120
The third informal step is to assess the possible accommodations
identified in terms of their effectiveness, reliability, and ability to be
provided without undue delay. The Committees emphasized that a rea-
sonable accommodation is to provide a "meaningful equal employment
opportunity," which the committees defined as "an opportunity to at-
tain the same level of performance as is available to non-disabled em-
ployees having similar skills and abilities."1 2'
The final step in the accommodation process is selection and im-
plementation of the appropriate accommodation. The Committees note
that although the employee's preferred accommodation is to be given
"primary consideration," the ultimate choice is the employer's. An em-
ployer is free to choose among effective accommodations and to select
the accommodation that is less expensive or easier to implement as long
as the selected accommodation provides a meaningful equal employ-
ment opportunity.122
3. Undue hardship
A particular reasonable accommodation is not required if an em-
119. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis in
original); see also AFGE Local 51 v. Baker, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. 1393(BNA) (N.D.
Cal. 1987).
120. Rosiak v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 679 F. Supp. 444 (M. D. Pa. 1987).
121. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 66.; SENATE REPORT, supra note
24, at 35.
122. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit affirmed a district court's statement of the legal standard under the Rehabilitation
Act: "[A]ithough the government is not obligated under the statute to provide plaintiff
with every accommodation he may request, the government must, at a minimum, pro-
vide reasonable accommodation as is necessary to enable him to perform his essential
functions." Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63, (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Carter v. Ben-
nett, 651 F. Supp. 1299, 1301).
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ployer can demonstrate that it would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of its business. a2' The ADA defines "undue hardship" as "an
action requiring significant difficulty or expense" when viewed in light
of four factors.
The House Committee on the Judiciary indicates that a definition
of "undue hardship" was provided in order to distinguish it from the de
minimis undue hardship standard applicable to religious reasonable ac-
commodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and to
differentiate the employment limitation from the definition of "readily
achievable" applicable to the removal of structural barriers in existing
facilities of public accommodations. 24 The Senate Committee on La-
bor and Human Resources and the House Committee on Education
and Labor indicate that "significant difficulty or expense" means an
action "that is unduly costly, extensive, substantial, disruptive, or that
will fundamentally alter the nature of the program."' a 5 A specified dol-
lar figure or numerical formula was not provided by Congress. Efforts
to create a presumption that an accommodation costing 10 % of an em-
ployee's annual salary would constitute undue hardship, were rejected
by the House Judiciary Committee 26 and on the floor of the House of
Representatives as arbitrary and unduly restrictive. 12 7
The statutory language and legislative history also indicate that
what constitutes a "significant difficulty or expense" is relative rather
than absolute and will depend on the particular employer's operation
and resources in relation to the nature and cost of the accommodation.
Accordingly, whether an accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship on a covered entity must be made on a case-by-case basis, by ap-
plying four statutory factors:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed . ..
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities in-
volved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the num-
ber of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and
resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the
operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall
size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number
123. Americans With Disabilities Act §§ 105, 101(10).
124. House REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3 at 40.
125. Id.
126. House REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 41.
127. 136 CONG. REC. H2470-2475 (daily ed. May 17, 1990).
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of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type or types of operations of the covered entity, including
the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such
entity; the geographic separateness, administrative or financial re-
lationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered
entity. 2
While the factors indicate that larger employers may be required
to accept a greater level of cost for a needed accommodation than
smaller employers, the resources of the employer alone are not necessa-
rily determinative. The House Judiciary Committee report explained
why Congress adopted factors permitting the EEOC and the courts to
consider the impact of an accommodation on the facility providing it,
as well as the effects on the overall employer:
The ADA also sets forth additional factors which are specifi-
cally addressed to entities which operate more than one facility.
Concerns were expressed that a court would look only at the re-
sources of the local facility involved, or only at the resources of the
parent company, in determining whether an accommodation im-
posed an undue hardship. The Committee believes that both of
these alternatives are unsatisfactory. Instead, the Committee in-
tends that the resources of both the local facility involved and of
the parent company as well as the relationship between the two, be
relevant to the undue hardship determination.
The Committee is responding particularly to concerns about
employers who operate in depressed or rural areas and are operat-
ing at the margin or at a loss. Specifically, concern was expressed
that an employer may elect to close a store if it is losing money or
only marginally profitable rather than undertake significant invest-
ments to make reasonable accommodations to employees with disa-
bilities. The Committee does not intend for the requirements of the
Act to result in the closure of neighborhood stores or in loss of jobs.
The Committee intends for courts to consider in determining "un-
due hardship," whether the local store is threatened with closure by
the parent company or is faced with job loss as a result of the re-
quirements of this Act.129
The House Education and Labor Committee report also notes that
additional factors may be considered in determining whether an accom-
128. Americans With Disabilities Act § 101(10)(B).
129. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 3, at 40-41.
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modation imposes an undue hardship. These factors include whether an
accommodation may be shared by or used by other applicants and em-
ployees with disabilities and whether external funding, e.g., a tax
credit, tax deduction, 130 or payment from a vocational rehabilitation
agency, is available to pay for all or a part of the cost of an accommo-
dation. Only the net cost to the employer should be used in determining
undue hardship where external funding is received or could be
received.'
H. Illegal Use of Drugs and Alcohol
While persons who are addicted to the use of illegal drugs have a
"disability" as that term is defined under the ADA,13 2 the illegal use of
drugs',3 removes a person from the protection of the Act when an em-
ployer discharges or fails to hire a person because of such drug us-
age. 34 However, an individual who has successfully completed a drug
rehabilitation program or who is erroneously regarded as illegally using
drugs or who is successfully rehabilitated and is no longer using drugs
illegally is not excluded from the definition of a "qualified individual
with a disability."'' 3 5 Congress was concerned that the ADA not be
130. As amended in 1990, the Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction of up
to $15,000 per year for expenses associated with the removal of qualified architectural
and transportation barriers. The 1990 amendment also permits eligible small businesses
to receive a tax credit for certain costs of compliance with the ADA. An eligible small
business is one whose gross receipts do not exceed $1,000,000 or whose workforce does
not consist of more than 30 full-time workers. Qualifying businesses may claim a credit
of up to 50 percent of eligible access expenditures that exceed $250 but do not exceed
$10,250. Examples of eligible access expenditures include the necessary and reasonable
costs of removing barriers, providing readers and interpreters, and acquiring or modify-
ing equipment or devices.
131. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 69.
132. Id. at pt. 2, at 51; pt. 3, at 28.
133. A "drug" is defined in section 101(6)(B) as a "controlled substance" as
defined in schedules I through V of the Controlled Substance Act. In general, these
schedules include drugs with varying degrees of potential for addiction and abuse, some
of which also have legitimate medical uses and which may be prescribed by a
physician.
134. Americans With Disabilities Act § 104(a). In addition, such an individual is
also removed from the definition of an individual with a disability pursuant to section
510(a). A similar provision was made applicable to Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 by amending the latter act's definition of an "individual with handicaps." See 29
U.S.C. § 706(8).
135. Americans With Disabilities Act § 104(b).
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used as a weapon by persons using illegal drugs against an employer
who was trying to rid its workplace of drugs and drug users. The Con-
ference Committee made this point plainly:
The provision excluding an individual who engages in the illegal
use of drugs from protection is intended to ensure that employers
may discharge or deny employment to persons who illegally use
drugs on that basis, without fear of being held liable for discrimi-
nation. The provision is not intended to be limited to persons who
use drugs on the day of, or within a matter of days or weeks before,
the employment action in question. Rather, the provision is in-
tended to apply to a person whose illegal use of drugs occurred
recently enough to justify a reasonable belief that a person's drug
use is current.136
In order to protect employers, the ADA specifically provides that
an employer may prohibit the use of illegal drugs or alcohol in the
workplace and to prohibit employees from being under the influence of
illegal drugs or alcohol while on the job. An employer may hold an
employee who is an alcoholic or drug user to the same standards of
performance and conduct that it requires of all its employees even if
performance or behavior problems result from the illegal use of drugs
or the use of alcohol. Employers may comply with the requirements of
the Drug Free Workplace Act of 1988, S  and otherwise comply with
any regulations pertaining to drug or alcohol use by employees in in-
dustries regulated by the Department of Defense, the Department of
Transportation, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.138 Finally,
the ADA explicitly permits employers to utilize drug tests to screen
applicants and employees and to take action based upon the results of
such a test. 39
136. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 64.
137. 41 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq.
138. Americans With Disabilities Act § 104(c).
139. Id. at § 104(d)(2). A drug test is not considered a medical examination
under the ADA. § 104(d)(1). A person with a positive drug test that indicates the
illegal use of drugs still may challenge the accuracy of the test and allege that he or
she is being "erroneously regarded" as an illegal user of drugs pursuant to section
104(b)(3). The ADA itself does not provide any standard by which the accuracy or
validity of a drug test result is to be determined. H.R. REP. No. 101-596, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 65 (1990).
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I. Medical Examinations and Inquiries About Disability
Historically, job applications and medical examinations frequently
inquired about an applicant's general health and fitness and were used
as screening devices to exclude persons with disabilities from positions
without any inquiry into an applicant's capacity to perform the position
in question.140 The ADA strictly regulates such inquiries. An employer
may not, in a job application or in an interview, ask whether an appli-
cant has a disability or about the nature or severity of a disability. The
Act permits employers to inquire of an applicant's ability to do essen-
tial job functions. An employer may require post-offer, pre-entry medi-
cal examinations if required of all new employees for a particular job
classification (e.g., firefighters, and police officers) regardless of disabil-
ity. The medical examination is allowed if conducted prior to assuming
job duties and if the results of the examination are used in compliance
with the legislation, including provisions for a reasonable accommoda-
tion for an applicant whose medical examination reveals an inability to
perform an essential function of the job. The results of such an exami-
nation must be kept confidential and in separate medical files, except
where it is necessary to inform supervisors or managers of work restric-
tions or needed accommodations, safety personnel if the disability
might require emergency treatment or government officials investigat-
ing compliance with the ADA. 41
Inquiries concerning an employee's health or disability status must
be job-related and consistent with business necessity. 4 Examinations
and inquiries permitted under this standard include those mandated by
federal, state or local law applicable to the transportation industry and
other industries where public safety is a paramount concern ."4 Also
explicitly permitted are voluntary medical examinations offered by an
employer as part of an employee health program."4 Examinations and
inquiries of current employees are subject to the same confidentiality
restrictions and the same prohibition against discriminatory use of the
information that are applicable to pre-employment inquiries. 145
140. SENATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 37; HousE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. 2,
at 73.
141. Americans With Disabilities Act § 102(c)(2).
142. Id. at § 102(c)(4)(A).
143. Id.
144. Id. at § 102(c)(4)(B).
145. Id. at § 102(c)(4)(C).
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J. Enforcement and Administration
The ADA incorporates the powers, remedies and procedures of Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for its enforcement scheme. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is charged with responsi-
bility for implementing and enforcing the ADA's employment provi-
sions, except with respect to litigation against state and local govern-
ments, which is granted to the-Attorney General. 46 The Commission
must issue substantive regulations by July 26, 1991.141 An individual
who believes he or she has been discriminated against in employment
on the basis of disability may file an administrative charge of discrimi-
nation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or with
state or local fair employment agencies having work-sharing agree-
ments with the Commission. In addition to possible litigation by the
Commission, a charging party may institute a private action in federal
or state court after receiving a right to sue letter from the Commission.
The remedies available for violations of the ADA are the same as
under Title VII: equitable and injunctive relief including hiring or rein-
statement, backpay, restoration of benefits148 and attorneys' fees for the
prevailing party.149 The ADA also prohibits any covered entity from
retaliating against any individual who opposes a practice he or she be-
lieves is unlawful under the Act or who files a charge or participates in
any proceeding under the ADA. Also prohibited is any attempt to co-
erce, intimidate or threaten any person from the enjoyment of any right
provided by the ADA.150
146. Section 107(a) incorporates by reference §§ 705, 706, 707 and 710 of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, -4,-5,-6,-8,-9 (1988).
147. Americans With Disabilities Act § 106.
148. Section 706(g) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) (1988).
149. Curiously, the ADA has two different attorneys' fees provisions, applicable
to employment litigation. Section 706(k) of Title VII, provides for attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party other the the government as part of the award of court costs. Section
505 provides for attorneys' fees for administrative and judicial proceedings and specifi-
cally authorizes the award of "litigation expenses." Americans With Disabilities Act §
505.
150. Id. at § 503.
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